

3. THE EARTHQUAKE IN HAITI

Nikola Gütermann and Eve Schneider

Located in the Caribbean basin, which is subject to frequent natural and environmental disasters, Haiti's geography can be considered as a liability (Eichler 2006: 5). It lies in the middle of the hurricane belt and is subject to severe storms, occasional flooding and earthquakes as well as periodic droughts (CIA 2011). On January 12, 2010, it was struck by a major 7.0Mw earthquake, affecting more than 3 million people and leading to significant protracted displacement.

INTRODUCTION: NATURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS IN HAITI

Natural disasters have long been part of Haitian history. The earliest recorded disaster was a hurricane that destroyed Santo Domingo in 1508; the first recorded disaster in modern times, "the great hurricane", struck the island in 1930 (Eichler 2010: 14). A wave of devastating disasters began with an earthquake in 1952 (prior to which quakes were virtually unknown on the island). Over the past decade, disasters have intensified and become more frequent. In 2004, for instance, Tropical Storm Jeanne killed over 3,000 people, mainly in Gonaïves. One year later, Hurricane Stan led to nearly 1,800 fatalities and left roughly \$3.9 billion in damage. However, the most brutal hurricane season ever experienced in Haiti was in 2008. Four storms (Fay, Gustav, Hanna, and Ike) destroyed agricultural land and crops, killed 793 Haitians, injured 548 people and destroyed or damaged around 100,000 homes (OCHA 2008: 1).

Meanwhile, the country's widespread environmental disasters, such as deforestation, soil erosion and inadequate supplies of potable water, exacerbate the already-heavy impact of natural disasters (CIA 2011). According to Alscher (2008: 29), Haiti has reduced its forest cover from 25% (1950) to 1% (2004). Such environmental degradation can

aggravates the impact of natural disasters such as in the case of Jeanne in 2004. Though merely a tropical storm, Jeanne's high death toll was due in part to the lack of tree cover (Masters d.u.). The same storm caused fewer than 20 deaths on the Dominican side of Hispanola, which is 28% covered by forests (Alscher 2008: 29).

Largely as a consequence of deforestation and the resulting soil erosion, soil degradation in Haiti is severe over almost the entire country. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 94.8% of Haitian soil is severely degraded and 97.1% of the total Haitian population lives on this degraded soil. Furthermore, with more than 98% of forests gone, little topsoil is left to hold rains, leading to increased and nearly-annual flooding events. Lastly, all of these factors are aggravated by Haiti's horseshoe shape, which gives it an disproportionately long coastline in the midst of one of the world's busiest tropical storm belts (Eichler 2006: 5).

These natural and environmental disasters went unaddressed in the years leading up to the quake, and caused significant social vulnerability among the poor. Thus, when a 7.0 earthquake struck the Southern coast of the country on January 12, 2010, conditions were ripe for a humanitarian catastrophe. Though centered at the town of Leogane, the impacts were strongly felt in the nearby metropolis and capital of Port-au-Prince. Though exact death toll, damage, and displacement figures are never precisely known, the quake is thought to have contributed to the deaths of tens or hundreds of thousands of people, and displaced between one and two million people from their homes.

These displaced persons adopted multiple strategies. Some crowded into Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps, while others went to live with relatives. Only the lucky few were able to make their way abroad. This paper examines these different strategies, with a special consideration

of the political response, services provided to the various groups, and the legal context in which all of these environmental migrants were living. The first section of the paper deals with the domestic situation faced by IDPs, while the second section examines the fate of those who attempted to relocate to other countries in the Western Hemisphere.

1. COPING WITH THE EARTHQUAKE: INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT STRATEGIES

Right after the quake, some families stayed on their property even though their house was destroyed, or was vulnerable to collapse due to aftershocks, while others moved away from the quake zone to find shelter elsewhere. These quake-crated IDPs can be distributed into two groups: 1) IDPs located in camps, which were mainly in urban areas; and 2) IDPs residing with host families, mainly in rural areas. However, it should be noted that the two groups were not so clearly defined in reality. Some households chose to keep a few members of the family in IDP camps, while sending others to live with host families in rural areas. Other IDPs traveled frequently between urban and rural areas over time. Still, this framework will be used in this paper for conceptual clarity.

1.1. Assessing protection and assistance to IDPs

1.1.1. The role of the International Organization for Migration (IOM)

IOM has had missions in Haiti since 1993. It was among the first organizations to respond to the flow of IDPs, and was able to do so by reallocating the funds scheduled for other emergency assistance missions. In the first 6 months following the earthquake, IOM distributed 2 millions Non-Food Items (NFIs) to 300,000 families and registered 720,000 IDPs. It is now the head organization of the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster, which is in charge of managing several major camps and registering the population of IDPs. IOM also established an information system that covers all known camps (including those not managed by international organizations); qualified patrols make regular visits to manage the system. Based on this field information, IOM issues regular surveys on the living conditions in camps, and on evictions or on the conditions of return of IDPs; it also informs IDPs about relocation opportunities.

However, many camps were built spontaneously on private ground or in places not sound for habitation. Consequently, starting a few weeks after the

quake, many IDPs were expelled by landowners. By March 2011, 8% of IDPs had been evicted from their camps; 25% more had been threatened with eviction (CCCM, 2011a). In a survey conducted on IDPs who had left camps, 35% declared that the reason for their departure was because they had been threatened of eviction. By comparison, 16% feared rains or hurricanes, 14% moved because of the poor living conditions and 14% because of security problems (CCCM, 2011b).


1.1.2. Living conditions in IDP Camps

Although a great amount of resources were allocated to camp management, living conditions in camps could be very difficult, especially in spontaneous camps. In the first few months, 100,000 households were given a tent each. But tents do not offer a sufficient protection to live through the rainy season, during which 60 to 80 mm of rain can fall in an hour. 64% of IDP camps provided no access to water and 47% did not have toilets. Access to such basic services is especially rare in smaller camps (fewer than 100 households) which account for 70% of all camps and 16% of the IDP population living in camps (CCCM, 2011c). Cases of violence have been reported.

Even though the number of IDPs living in camps has steadily decreased, almost half of the initial IDP camp population remains, and the rate at which camps are emptying has also begun to slow. Between January and March 2011, the number of large and medium-sized camps (more than 100 IDPs) decreased while the number of small IDP sites (1-19 households) grew by 17% (CCCM, 2011c). This is particularly concerning since, as mentioned above, living conditions in small spontaneous sites are more severe and people are facing stronger threats of eviction.

1.1.3. IDPs in rural areas

From a humanitarian perspective, the interesting thing about IDP sites is that a lot of data is available on them and about the IDPs they are housing: where they are moving, what their needs are, and so on. Thus, despite the lack of financial resources, response strategies can be planned. On the contrary, movements of IDPs to host families in rural areas are more difficult to assess, because IDPs are not captured in the data and become invisible. Even counting them requires small-scale, costly surveys of rural households. Estimates of IDPs living with guest families in rural areas put the number between 500,000 and 600,000, or 30% of the total number of IDPs. 96% of them were hosted by immediate family members (either within the home, or in makeshift homes in gardens). In some areas, 43% of rural households reported hosting

Figure 3. Urban-rural migrations in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake

Source: JTF-Haiti. Operation Unified Response. Found under: <https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/haiti>

new people after the earthquake; on average, they were hosting 4 adults and 2 children.

The main problem in rural areas is that IDPs arrived with very little or no resources in households that were already poor themselves. Economic and natural resources were rapidly overstretched: reports show that within a few weeks, many rural households had eaten the stock of food they had planned to live on for four months, until the next harvesting season. With no savings, some had to sell their production tools (shovels, land, seeds, etc) in order to buy food. These households are now facing high food insecurity since they cannot produce enough for the next season. Coping strategies analyses show that they have reduced the number of meals per day, and the quantity of food eaten at each meal. Rural households have also turned to other sources of income such as tree cutting for charcoal production, even though they are aware that this practice makes their immediate environment more fragile and therefore exposes them to heightened environmental threats.

80% of IDPs hosted in rural households are unemployed. One response from IOM was to launch large Cash-For-Work (CFW) programs. The idea is simple: IOM hires IDPs to rebuild roads and

evacuate the rubble. This program provides them with the salary they need and helps rebuilding the country, by involving the population in the reconstruction process. IOM's policy was to give priority to IDPs, therefore 70% of their hires were IDPs against just 30% locals of rural areas. However, this practice proved controversial, for several reasons. First, local people also needed cash in order to buy food – for which prices rose sharply after the quake – and production tools, so IOM's policy was seen as unfair and created social tensions. Secondly, wages paid by IOM were three to four times higher than wages for agricultural workers, many of whom therefore chose to abandon agriculture temporarily to earn more, putting the regional agricultural production at risk. Third, work opportunities were very short-term, so as to maximize turnover and reach more beneficiaries. Since many of the workers were untrained, this practice elevated the risk of work-related accidents. Finally, rubble removal requires very expensive equipment, such as trucks, which were provided by foreign companies and international organizations. Thus, much of the money did not reach intended beneficiaries, and the impact was much smaller than anticipated (USAID Inspector General, 2010).

1.2. Sustaining livelihood: relocation and returning home strategies and challenges

With so many problems in IDP camps, why did so many stay? Many simply did not know where to go: this was the reason given by 55% of IDPs still in camps. Housing reconstruction is on-going, and many IDPs do not know what state their house is in. The Ministry for Public Works used a three-color coding system for housing: green for “not damaged”, orange for “in need of repair”, and red for “unsafe and in need of demolition”. However, a survey by the CCCM Cluster showed that 35% of people residing in camps do not know how their house was classified (CCCM, 2011c). In addition, more than 70% of Port-au-Prince residents rent housing, and since rents for “green coded” houses have increased by 300% since the quake, many families on modest incomes cannot return. Finally, Haitian property law is highly disorganized, and many households existed on land with vague property rights.

IDPs also need cash to relocate their household, and they need livelihoods in their new communities, as well as basic public services, water, sanitation, transport, education. Both the evacuation of rubble and reconstruction are on-going and are taking more time in poorer neighborhoods, which prevent families from going back. What’s more, IDP camps are often closer to home communities than permanent, reconstructed options (cf. map 2 in Annex, showing IDP sites near Port-au-Prince). Ironically, leaving IDP camps would mean further displacement from family, friends, social networks, and livelihoods than simply staying put. What’s more, fear of returning to permanent buildings after the experience of the earthquake has also proven a barrier to return.

Between January and March 2011, the average number of people in households in IDP sites fell from 4.3 to 4.1. The decrease implies that households were sending family members (mainly male heads of household) to their future relocation site, while keeping some family members in the camp, where at least a few services were accessible. This strategy allows families to prepare for their relocation while minimizing risks. However, when they do leave, about two-thirds of IDPs choose to return home over relocating elsewhere. Even after relocation, conditions are difficult: only 40% of relocated people live in undamaged houses, whereas 30% live in houses in need of repair or unsafe houses, and 30% live in a tent or in makeshift shelters on plots (CCCM, 2011b).

In rural areas, some parents also chose to leave their children with their host families and to

register them at school, while they looked for work in urban areas or engaged in CFW activities. IDPs in rural areas are increasingly children, women with babies, and elderly people, categories who are not able to contribute to agricultural work. This demographic shift puts added pressure on rural families’ resources, who have to feed more people with less labor and increased environmental vulnerability: in short, a recipe for major food insecurity. At the same time, the bulk of international reconstruction aid has been distributed to urban areas, both for reconstruction and to improve access to public services. Labor migrants are pulled towards urban zones for employment, while rural areas (which were less directly affected by the quake) must cope with housing and feeding large vulnerable populations.

1.3. Improving the response to internal displacement

Even prior to the 2010 earthquake, Haiti was one of the poorest countries in the world, and the poorest of the Northern Hemisphere. It has been struck by a series of natural disasters and has proven structurally vulnerable as a country. So that rebuilding must also mean investing in people’s ability to cope with natural disasters. Although another earthquake of this magnitude is unlikely to occur again soon, Haiti will regularly be struck by violent storms and hurricanes in the years to come, especially in an era of climate change. Haitians need to be prepared for these natural threats. After the quake, some proposed that Port-au-Prince be entirely demolished and reconstructed in order to offer better living conditions and improved protection against natural disasters. However, such proposals encountered major financial, social, and logistical challenges.

One of the strategies of the CCCM Cluster was to keep as many people as possible in rural areas in order to avoid IDP return to the overcrowded and most vulnerable neighborhoods of larger cities (Pascal, 2011). However, most IDPs felt that their displacement was temporary, and that they should return home to their cities and neighborhoods as soon as possible. Indeed, most of the voluntary migration in recent months has been composed of people returning to urban centers, either permanently or in circular migration from rural areas. These sorts of intentions and desires should be a part of employment, development, and migration strategies in the reconstruction phase, something that has not always been done in this case.

It is also important not to focus only on urban areas for reconstruction. IDPs have put heavy social pressure on rural areas, and have affected both

livelihoods and coping capacities of rural populations. Aid must be provided quickly to rural areas, not only to avoid an aggravation of the current situation and a humanitarian crisis, but also for the long run. Rural development aid, and particularly agricultural aid, is essential to the country's reconstruction, in order to avoid a new exodus out of rural areas in the years to come. Rural farmers must be capable of producing sufficiently to feed themselves and to save for coping in crises.

In addition, an urban-centric reconstruction process might attract a surplus of labor migrants, adding to already overcrowded urban areas. Reconstruction has to be done quickly, but it should not offer wages and job opportunities that are so advantageous that they would compete with other vital economic activities, such as the agricultural sector.

Temporary migration has also proven, in the Haitian case, to be a valuable adaptation strategy. Families planning to relocate have been sending individual members to future relocation destinations in order to minimize risks, prepare for moves, and improve livelihoods. This sort of beneficial strategy can be aided by the provision of quality information on return/relocation opportunities.

2. THE CASE OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS

2.1. Haitian international migration patterns prior to the 2010 earthquake

From the late 19th Century through the 1930s, poor rural Haitians increasingly began to migrate to Cuba and the Dominican Republic to find work in the sugar plantations (Alscher, 2009: 10). Since the mid-1950s, migration ties to the United States and, to a lesser extent, Canada have also been important. As the country descended into chaos after the breakdown of the Duvalier dictatorship in the late 1980s, Haitians began arriving in the United States in large numbers. Between 1980 and 2000, the Haitian population residing in the United States more than quadrupled from 92,000 to 419,000 to around 535,000 in 2010 (Terrazas, 2010). Haitians have also migrated to Europe in recent years, though in much smaller numbers (Alscher, 2008: 46).

But how did environmental factors (including the earthquake) impact these migration pathways? Environmental degradation and disasters appear to be important triggers for Haitian migrations outside Haiti's borders as well. Indeed, as Myers

(1993: 189) states, Haitian people are "abandoning their homelands in part because their country has become an environmental basket case". The poor management and use of environmental resources impedes a prospering agricultural economy.

However, political instability and oppression are also critically important to Haitians' migration decisions. As Catanese (1999: 51, cit en Alscher 2009: 3) underlines, Haitian migration is induced by both environmental and political factors that have "reinforced each other over long periods of Haitian history". Poor governance has had the effect of weakening food security, reducing state capacity, and triggering environmental migration. Such problems in governance include both the serious flaws of the Duvalier regime as well as macroeconomic stabilization policy in the modern era (Eliscar 2010, Dupuy 2011). Indeed, the conditions put by the IMF and the World Bank for the payback of the debt, "impeded the development process of Haiti by demanding the breaking down of tariff barriers on imports" (Eliscar, 2010:22). Lowering tariffs impacted on Haitian food security as foreign commodities now flood the national markets in a way that Haitian producers have not been able to compete with (Dupuy, 2011). Furthermore, with less state investment in the agrarian sector, the conditionalities put a toll on rural populations and forced them to metropolitan areas in search of factory-related employment opportunities (Eliscar, 2010: 22). The result was a rural exodus, as laborers flowed to Port-au-Prince⁵, as well as abroad, to the Dominican Republic, the wider Caribbean, and North America.

2.2. Neighboring countries' responses to Haitian international migrations

2.2.1. Migration to the United States

Since the United States is home to the largest number of overseas Haitians (535,000 people; Terrazas, 2010), it is worth analyzing the impact of the quake on Haiti-US migration flows. Immediately after the earthquake, US immigration rules were relaxed. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) extended Temporary Protected Status (TPS), which is a "temporary immigration benefit that allows qualified individuals from designated countries (or parts of those countries) who are in the United States to stay here for a limited time period" (USCIS 2011), and offered an 18-month

5. Ironically, this rural-to-urban migration flow was halted not by economic change, but by the natural disaster of the earthquake, which created what Robert Fatton (2010) calls "a reverse exodus" back to rural areas.

visa to Haitians who arrived in the USA prior to the earthquake. According to the U.S. Department of State, 54,716 Haitians had approved petitions to migrate to the United States at the time of the earthquake and were waiting for visas to become available (Wasem, 2011: iii). Furthermore, deportations in progress were halted by the DHS (Zissis, 2010). Nevertheless, three days after the earthquake, Secretary of the DHS Janet Napolitano warned of the consequences of Haitian fleeing to the USA:

“At this moment of tragedy in Haiti it is tempting for people suffering in the aftermath of the earthquake to seek refuge elsewhere. But attempting to leave Haiti now will only bring more hardship to the Haitian people and nation... It is important to note that TPS will apply only to those individuals who were in the United States as of January 12, 2010. Those who attempt to travel to the United States after January 12, 2010 will not be eligible for TPS and will be repatriated” (DHS Jan. 15, 2010).

According to the Coast Guard, 1,377 Haitians have been interdicted at sea in the fiscal year 2010, a smaller number than in previous years (Aguilera, 2010). These figures imply that attempts by Haitians to reach the USA (illegally and usually in small, unseaworthy boats) fell following the earthquake (a.u. EU Times 2010). Certainly the increased surveillance of the Coast Guard and military warships was a deterrent. But Michael A. Clemens, of the Washington-based Center for Global Development, points to a different reason: cost. The journey costs \$600-1000—well beyond reach for many families in the aftermath of the quake.⁶ Simultaneously, the US Department of Homeland Security reported a drop in the flow of *legal* migrants, from 26,007 and 25,859 in 2008 and 2009, respectively, to 22,582 in 2010. (Monger and Yankay [DHS] 2011:4). In the aftermath of the quake, it seems that financial resources for all forms of migration to the US were hard to come by.

One year after the earthquake, 1.3 million Haitians still remain displaced from their homes (Wasem 2011: 17). Nevertheless, in January 2011, US-immigration authorities began repatriating Haitians to their country (Armario, 2011). David Abraham, expert on US-immigration law, explains the repatriating of Haitians as follows: “The crudest explanation has always been that the situation in Haiti is endemically so bad, that if irregular entry is permitted to take hold, a dam would break and Haitians would come in massive numbers. On the one hand, the policy is a defence of the formal legal procedures for admission and immigration and the requirement that everyone follow those

rules. On the other hand, it is a desire to keep Haitian immigration at a minimum. Now that the short-term earthquake emergency is over, it’s back to normal. If people are allowed to stay on, they will build social connections and become integrated into communities, and it then becomes much harder to deport them” (Abraham interview, 2011). A January 2010 *USA Today*/Gallup poll backs these statements, showing that a majority of Americans (53%) are opposed to accepting more Haitian immigrants into the United States. Abraham further maintains that “Haitians--like all unskilled immigrants--put negative pressure on the labor market, especially on the wages of the already-poor natives (mostly Black and Hispanic)...It’s the rude masses that the state is worried about” (Abraham, 2011).

But Abraham’s comments beg the question: does the US really have to worry about the “rude masses”? Clemens counters that, in the 10 years prior to the earthquake, 118,000 Haitians were caught in the high seas and violently brought back to their “prison” that they were desperately trying to escape. This number represents just 1/26 of 1% of the current US population, and constitutes a group that is much too small to have any negative impact on the labor market. These forcibly repatriated Haitians became what Clemens calls “avoidable victims” of the 2010 quake (Clemens, 2011). Second, Clemens identifies a misconception of Haitian immigrants’ roles in US society: they are seen as a threat rather than as a valuable human resource.

Similarly, Lardner (cit. in Wasem 2011:7) asserts that the term of “threat to national security” was “being construed too broadly, being applied arbitrarily to Haitians, and wasting limited resources” in the aftermath of the quake. Clemens also notes that, for 28 years (1952 to 1980), US refugee law provided designations for environmental causes of displacement. It is only in modern times that the US has reverted to strict immigration control in the wake of natural disasters. Moreover, Wasem (2011: ii) observes that “Haitians are not afforded the same treatment as other asylum seekers”, and that Haitians have been “singled out for more restrictive treatment” (Senate Subcommittee on Immigration 2002, cit. in Wasem 2011: 7)—even before the quake. Thus, the American clampdown on Haitian immigration after the quake is retrograde, but hardly unusual given the social and political context.

2.2.2. Migration to Latin American countries

In contrast to decreasing migration flows towards the USA, the Jesuit Refugees Service (JRS) and the Jesuit Migrants Service (JMS) have recorded increased numbers of migrants towards neighbouring Latin American and Caribbean countries after the 2010 earthquake (Stapleton

6. Interview with Michael A. Clemens on April 13th, 2011.

2010). According to Edson Louidor, in charge of communications for JRS/JMS in Latin America, trafficking networks have emerged, promising Haitians passage to the French Guyana or the USA (for work or study) in exchange of money. However, these Haitians are mainly being abandoned in Brazil or in Ecuador. These activities have led to border crackdowns in French Guyana and Brazil in the year following the quake (Wilner, 2011). In Brazil, Haitians fleeing the consequences of the earthquake are not entitled to refugee status. The status is given to people escaping circumstances such as political or ethnic persecution and religious discrimination, but not to those fleeing poverty and the consequences of natural disasters (Stapleton, 2011). In February 2011, Brazil completely suspended the issuance of refugee status to Haitians.

The number of Haitians in Ecuador has also risen significantly after the earthquake according to the JRS Ecuador Director Fernando Ponce (Stapleton, 2011). Based on statistics provided by immigration police services, 1,258 Haitians arrived in Ecuador in 2009, a further 1,867 in 2010 and as many as 1,112 during the first months of 2011. In addition, the national tourism office in Chile reported that 820 Haitians entered the country in 2010, almost twice as many as in 2009 (477); 125 more arrived in January 2011 (Stapleton, 2011). Though the flows are small, these numbers show a clear increase in international migration to South America in the aftermath of the quake.

Concerning migration toward the Dominican Republic, Dominican migration director Sigfrido Pared Perez estimated that the earthquake led to a 15% increase in the Haitian migrant population (a.u. 2010). Like the USA, the Dominican Republic restarted the process of repatriating Haitians to their country at the beginning of 2011, ending a moratorium put in place after the 2010 earthquake. As of mid-March 2011, nearly 7,000 illegal Haitian migrants had been brought back to Haiti (a.u. 2011). The Dominican Republic and Haiti have long been urged to work more closely to solve shared problems like environmental degradation and poverty. But the paramount issue has always been migration. The response of political leaders to this latest source of tension will be crucial for future relations between the countries.

2.3. Moving forward: improving the response to disaster-induced international migration

Migration is often an indicator of poverty, poor governance, and environmental misery in sending areas. It is also a response to these conditions.

Indeed, Michael A. Clemens noted that “migration and remittances have been responsible for almost all of the poverty reduction that has happened in the island country over the past few decades”. Such continuous remittances of Haitians in the US are higher in the long term than official development assistance. Thus, Clemens proposes to accord a special immigration status to “victims of environmental degradation or disaster” and thus considers an entire new class of immigration (“golden door” visa), which would let more Haitians into the USA and could improve conditions in Haiti, as well. For David Abraham, on the other hand, “it would be a revolutionary idea to include “victims of environmental catastrophes” in the asylum category, as all countries have so far refused economic conditions as a ground for asylum status, even when those economic conditions have been caused by chaos, the disorder of failed states, etc. However, Clemens counters that there is precedent in US law for environmental causes to be considered among those seeking refugee status.

Despite the legal context, the fact remains that migration to the US is an expensive proposition: hence the fall in migration to the US in the immediate aftermath of the quake. Still, if Haiti fails to reform its agricultural sector to promote food security and productivity, there will be people who try to leave Haiti in search of a better life elsewhere. Yet in spite of the humanitarian imperative, the 2010 earthquake has proven that powers in the region, such as the US and Brazil, are still hostile to open borders. In the international arena, it may be time to consider the establishment of “environmental refugee” as a status in international law.

CONCLUSION

Throughout Haitian history, internal and international migration, political and economic instability, and environmental and natural disasters have been bound up in one another. Before the earthquake, many Haitian farmers and peasants had to leave their land as a consequence of environmental damages such as soil degradation, floods and droughts, which have not been addressed sustainably. The worsening humanitarian situation and the inability of the Haitian government to offer basic needs to their urban population after the devastating earthquake in January 2010 has forced many to migrate back to the rural areas they once fled due to over-exploitation of natural resources. Others have tried to leave or left the country, mainly destined for Latin American and Caribbean countries. Migrations towards Ecuador, Brazil, Chile and the Dominican

Republic all increased in 2010, implying a link to the earthquake and its aftermath. Meanwhile, migration—legal and illegal—to the US has fallen, due to strict immigration controls and the high cost of the journey.

Although the 2010 earthquake was a seismic—rather than climatic—event, climate change will almost certainly pose more natural hazards to the country. Therefore, disaster risk reduction strategies and protection policies for displaced persons must be implemented. By studying the

case, we can learn a great deal that may be useful for future humanitarian practice. Haitians made use of multiple migration strategies in the aftermath of the quake. They were occasionally abetted by international actors, and sometimes thwarted by policies and legal loopholes that hurt their search for a better life. Vast policy change is needed, both domestically and internationally, both to improve the current humanitarian situation in Haiti, and to bolster resilience in the face of future disasters. ■

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abraham, David (April 19, 2011). Interview with author. Professional Title: Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
- Alscher, S. (2009). "Hispaniola Island (Dominican Republic and Haiti)". Each For Case Study Report. Found under: http://www.each-for.eu/documents/CSR_Hispaniola_090126.pdf
- Alscher, S. (2008). "Latin American & Caribbean". Each For Case Study Report.. Found under:http://www.each-for.eu/documents/EACH-FOR_D.2.6.1_General_Overview_Study_-_Latin_America_short.pdf
- Aguilera, E. (Dec. 27th, 2010). "Rise in Haitian immigrants could signify oncoming wave". Border & Immigration. Found under: <http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/dec/27/rise-haitian-immigrants-could-signify-oncoming-wav/>
- Armario, C. (Jan 21st, 2011). "US Deports First Haitians since Earthquake". The Associate Press. Found under: <http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/us-deports-first-haitians-earthquake>
- AuthorUnknown (a.u.) (Aug. 4th, 2010). "In Dominican Republic, conflicting attitudes toward Haiti". Global Post. Found under <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/americas/100723/haiti-dominican-republic-immigrants?page=full>
- Author unknown (a.u.) (March 25th, 2011). "Legal Haitian immigrants deported from Dominican Republic". The Universe Catholic Weekly. Found under <http://www.totalcatholic.com/tc/index.php?/201103231640/news/legal-haitian-immigrants-deported-from-dominican-republic.html>
- Author Unknown (a.u.). (Aug 7th, 2010). "US Coast Guard intercepted 323 illegal migrants from Haiti". EU Times. Found under: <http://www.eutimes.net/2010/08/us-coast-guard-intercepted-323-illegal-migrants-from-haiti/>
- Author Unknown (a.u.). (2010). "Haiti IDP Migration in Relation to Flood Trends". Operation Unified Response, JTF-Haiti. Found under: https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/haiti/Crisis%20Documents/JIAHCC%20-%20Other%20Files/Common%20Operating%20Picture/Haiti_Migration_and_Historic_Flooding_7FEB10%5B1%5D.pdf
- CCCM, 2011a. Evictions Report: March 2011. Accessed at http://www.ccmhaiti.info/z_eviction_report_march_2011.php on July 15, 2011.
- CCCM, 2011b. IDP Return Survey: March 2011. Accessed at http://www.ccmhaiti.info/z_internally_displaced_persons_return_survey.php on July 16, 2011.
- CCCM, 2011c. Displacement Tracking Matrix v2.0 update: March 2011. Accessed at http://www.ccmhaiti.info/y_dtm_data.php on July 15, 2011.
- Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]. (2011). "Haiti". The World Factbook. Found under: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html>
- Clemens, Michael, April 13, 2011. Interview by author. Professional title: Professor of Political Science, Georgetown University; Researcher, Center for Global Development.
- Dupuy, A. (Jan 9, 2011). Beyond the Earthquake: A Wake-Up Call for Haiti. Found under: <http://celucienjoseph.wordpress.com/2011/01/09/beyond-the-earthquake-a-wake-up-call-for-haiti-by-professor-alex-dupuy/>
- Eichler, L. (2006). "Community-based Environmental Management: A Tool For Natural Disaster Risk Reduction in Haiti?" MEM Master's Project, Duke University. Found under: http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/68/MP_lse_a_122006.pdf;jsessionid=A540211A181E67099FBE6C767C6F0588?sequence=1
- Eliscar, J. D.R. (2010). "Environmental and Natural Disasters in Haiti: The Impacts of Failed Policies From 2004 to 2010". Graduate Masters Theses. Paper 32. Found under:http://scholarworks.umb.edu/masters_theses/32
- Fatton, R. (Jan 26th, 2010). "Hope amidst Devastation: Toward a New Haitian State". The Carter G. Woodson Institute For African-American and African Studies. Found under: <http://news.clas.virginia.edu/woodson/x16474.xml>
- Haggerty, R.A. (ed). (1989). Dominican Republic: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Found under: <http://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/>
- Masters, J. (d.u.). Hurricanes and Haiti: A Tragic History. Weather Underground. Found under: <http://www.wunderground.com/resources/education/haiti.asp>
- Monger, R. And J. Yankay. (2011). "U.S. Legal Permanent Residents: 2010". Departement of Homeland Security [DHS]. Found under: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/lpr_fr_2010.pdf
- Morales, L. (Jan 25, 2010). Americans Lean Against Letting More Haitians Into U.S. GALLUP. Found under: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/125372/Americans-Lean-Against-Letting-Haitians.aspx>
- Myers, N. (1993). Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of Political Stability, New York and London: W.W. Norton.
- Napolitano, J. (Jan. 15th, 2010). "Statement from Secretary Janet Napolitano" [U.S. Department of Homeland Security], press release. Found under http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1263595952516.shtm
- Natural disaster. (n.d.). Dictionary.com's 21st Century Lexicon. Retrieved April 5th, 2011, from Dictionary.com website: [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/natural disaster](http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/natural%20disaster)
- Office for the Coordination of humanitarian affairs [OCHA]. (2008). Haiti. Flash Appeal Revision. United Nations: New York. Foun under: http://www.ht.undp.org/_assets/fichier/publication/pubdoc36.pdf?PHPSESSID=5dda3ded4990abb818b77263a01e39e
- Pascal, Peggy, 2011. Interviewed by author. Professional title: Food Security Advisor, Solidarities International.
- Sontag, D. (March 16th, 2010). "Rural Haiti Struggles to Absorb Displaced". The New York Times. Found under: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/world/americas/17rural.html?_r=1

Stapleton, J. (April 14th 2011). "Latin American: regional response needed to address the needs of Haitian migrants". Jesuit Refugee Service. Found under https://www.jrs.net/news_detail?TN=NEWS-20110414095420&L=EN

Terrazas, A. (Jan. 2010). "Haitian Immigrants in the United States". Migration Policy Institute. Found under: <http://www.migrationinformation.org/USFocus/display.cfm?id=770&feed=rss>

The African-American Migration Experience [AAME]. (2011). From Haiti to the United States. Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture. The New York Public Library. Found under: <http://www.inmotionaame.org/migrations/topic.cfm?migration=12&topic=3>

USAID Office of the Inspector General, September 2010. "Audit of USAID's Cash-for-Work Activities in Haiti". Accessed at www.usaid.gov/oig/public/fy10rpts/1-521-10-009-p.pdf on July 17, 2011.

US Citizenship and Immigration Status [USCIS]. (2011). Temporary Protected Status & Deferred Enforced Departure. Found under: <http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=390d3e4d77d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnnextchannel=390d3e4d77d73210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD>

US Department of Homeland Security [DHS]. (Jan 15, 2010). Statement from Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano on Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitian Nationals. Found under: http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1263595952516.shtm

Virdee, Jazz, June 2010. "Host Community Guidelines". Prepared for Inter-Agency Standing Committee (Haiti Shelter Cluster) and Caritas Cordaid.

Wasem, R. E. (2011). "U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants". Congressional Research Service. Found under <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21349.pdf>

Wilner, J-L. (March 29th, 2011). "Le nombre de migrants haïtiens en Amérique latine augmente après le séisme". Haiti Press Network. Found under: http://www.hpnhaiti.com/site/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2661:le-nombre-des-migrants-haitiens-augmente-apres-le-seisme-en-amerique-latine&catid=2:economic&Itemid=6

Zissis, C. (Jan. 27th, 2010). "The Haitian Migration Debate". Americas Society. Found under: <http://www.as-coa.org/article.php?id=2130>